



























This paper surveys the evolution of the Kuznet’s hypothesis and recent
ﬁndings of the inequality and growth literature. The main emphasis of the
recent literature has been on the rise of wage inequality. Although the negative
relation between inequality and growth is now well established in theoretical
literature, there are discrepancies in the recent empirical ﬁndings. A possible
solution is suggested which emphasizes the role of demand patterns created
by inequality.
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11I n t r o d u c t i o n
Although many fruitful attempts have been made over the last forty years start-
ing with the Kuznet’s (55) seminal work, the relationship between inequality and
growth still remains a puzzle in terms of its sign , both short term and long
term characteristics and underlying mechanisms. For instance, while the older ap-
proaches suggest that the inequality and growth are positively linked due to equity
and eﬃciency trade-oﬀ , the newer literature questions the validity of this trade-oﬀ
especially in the presence of incomplete ﬁnancial markets. While earlier literature
suggests a positive relation between inequality and growth due to investment in-
divisibilities, the newer literature points out that in the presence of investment
indivisibilities and imperfect capital markets, inequality is bad for growth. Ini-
tial theoretical ﬁndings suggest that inequality increase growth.Most of the recent
theoretical ﬁndings in the literature,however, indicate the opposite. On the one
hand ,the recent empirical ﬁndings mostly support the negative relation. On the
other hand, the support for the nature of this relation, other than the sign, have
not been so unambigious.A debate concerns if the relation between inequality and
growth can be linearly estimated. There are also discrepancies in the empirical lit-
erature.There are many issues like the above at hand, which continuously attracts
opposing views.
In a market economy, today’s distribution of endowments, along with the mar-
ket interactions, is responsible in determining the tomorrow’s distribution. Since
this process repeats itself growth and inequality are necessarily intertwined. The
eﬀect of inequality on growth has attracted a renewed interest in the literature
and with the emergence of new works on the rising wage inequality in major in-
dustrialized countries , the inequality and growth literature has established itself
2as a major area of economics. The motivation for this book was in part due to
the large amount of work that has been done and its scope. Its aim is to put the
body of evidence into a clearer picture and, if at all, to give a perspective which
hopefully will shed light into future research. For this purpose, I will ﬁrst brieﬂy
state why the classical economists have maintained the view that inequality is not
detrimental to growth and then I will categorize the areas which the newer liter-
ature indicate as the possible sources of the negative relation between inequality
and growth.
First, the notion of inequality should be made clear. Inequality in this survey
is either wealth inequality or wage inequality each ofwhich is relevant to diﬀerent
approaches to the analysis of the link between inequality and growth. When
analyzing the eﬀect of inequality on growth using income or wealth inequality
or their proxies is more appropriate. When analyzing the eﬀect of growth on
inequality then using data on wage inequality is more suitable since changes in
productivity are mostly reﬂected in wages
In this survey I’ll try to clarify what those issues are and give a broader picture
of the substansive literature and where it is heading. A similar kind of work has
been done recently by Aghion,Caroli and Penalosa (2003) who give a summary of
the new approaches to inequality and growth , particularly with respect to tech-
nical and organizational change and trade liberalization. Their main emphasis is,
on the most part, is not on the eﬀects of inequality on growth but rather sources
of inequality which have attracted most of the attention in the recent literature.
My survey diﬀers from theirs in several aspects: First it directly links the exist-
ing theories to the relevant empirical ﬁndings by examining the discrepancies in
those ﬁndings. Secondly, it considers aﬀects of demand patterns on growth which
stem from inequality. Third, it considers the most recent empirical ﬁndings on
3the sources of the rising wage inequality. And ﬁnally, it looks at the Kuznet’s
hypothesis as a seperate strand of literature.
The plan of this survey is as follows: I will ﬁrst give a brief historical review
on the subject concentrating on Kuznet’s hypothesis. In the third chapter, I
will brieﬂy review both the theoretical and empirical literature on the eﬀect of
inequality on growth with the emphasis on the latter. The fourth chapter surveys
the sources inequality in some of the industrialized countries as they matter to
the process of growth. I will also summarize the recent empirical ﬁndings on the
subject. The ﬁfth chapter concludes.
2 Historical Perspective
It will be appropriate to start by brieﬂy mentioning Kuznets not only for the famed
inverted U-hypothesis but also for some ideas which have recurred in the literature
but seldom cited as his,. (Kuznets 1955, p. 6) wrote:
‘ As technology and economic performance rise to higher levels, incomes are less
subject to transient disturbances, not necessarily of the cyclical order that can be
recognized and allowed for by reference to business cycle chronology, but of a more
irregular type. If in the earlier years the economic fortunes of units were subject
to greater vicissitudes- poor crops for some farmers, natural calamity losses for
some nonfarm business units - if the overall proportion of individual entrepreneurs
whose incomes were subject to such calamities,..,was larger in earlier decades, these
earlier distributions of income would be more aﬀected by transient disturbances’.
Kuznets (1955) observes that inequality in percentage shares within the rural
population is lower than in that for the urban population. When this observa-
tion is coupled with the fact that the per capita income of the rural population is
4also lower than that of the urban, an increasing weight of the urban population,
for example a migration to cities, should increase the weight of the more unequal
distribution and hence increase inequality. Moreover, higher savings rate of the
upper-income groups should yield more income for them and their descendants
through higher asset holdings, further widening the inequality. Nevertheless, the
empirical evidence until 1955 suggests that income inequality have been narrowing
in the industrialist countries for several decades. Kuznets postulates several groups
of factors which prevents inequality from increasing none of which could empiri-
cally conﬁrmed mainly due to the lack of data . Some of them are the legislative
interference in the form of inheritance taxes and limiting the yield on accumulated
property , for example, through rent control. The others are the rapid growth
of new industries creating new fortunes for the people of lower income groups.
The third one is that the wages are limited for the rich and their descendants
from above, since for this group the inter-industry shifts are more limited, whereas
for the middle wage earners shifts to booming industries are likely. By observing
the characteristics of the urban growth with reference to its lower income group
Kuznets conjectures a theory of ‘swinging’ inequality in which the inequality in-
creases during the initial phases of industrialization process and decrease later.
The reference group, which consists of people who mostly migrated from rural
areas in the course of urbanization constitute a larger part of the population in
industrialized countries. Once having settled in the cities, through adaptation
and organization they become a political power leading to legislations protecting
their interests. And ﬁnally,this will gradually enhance their position in the income
distribution.
As an implication of the analysis above Kuznets suggested an inverted U-shape
relation between income inequality and GNP per head. To fortify his argument
5Kuznet’s estimated the time periods in which the inequality in industrialist coun-
tries has increased and subsequently declined. The increase in inequality he con-
jectured occured during 1780-1850 in England and during 1840-1890 in US and
Germany whereas the fall in inequality occured in the last quarter of 19th in Eng-
land and after the ﬁrst world war in US and Germany.
Early estimation of the Kuznets process utilizing cross-section data seem to
support the inverted U shape such as in Paukert(73), Adelman and Morris(73),
Ahluwalia (74, 76) Chenery and Syrquin (75) and Loehr(81). In particular, Ahluwalia
(1976) ﬁnds strong support for the reversal of increasing tendency of inequality by
estimating the following equation
I = α + β log10 y + γ [log10 y]
2 + δD + ε
where I is an index of inequality ,proxied by the income share of the highest
20% , middle 40% and the lowest 20% percent of the population respectively, and
yi sp e rc a p i t aG N P .T h ed u m m yv a r i a b l e ,D, takes the value 1 if the country is
socialist and 0 otherwise. Ahluwalia ﬁnds positive β and negative γ for the top 20%
and vice versa for the rest of the population. This indicates an upright U curve
for the evolution of income share of the poor which in turn implies an inverted
U-curve with regards to evolution of inequality as per capita GNP increases.
These ﬁndings of Ahluwalia along with Paukert’s,which are widely cited, seem
to form basis of the early support for the Kuznets hypothesis. Robinson (76, p.
437) also indicates that ‘the inverse U - relationship has acquired the force of
economic law’ Furthermore, the Kuznet’s hypothesis was used for projections of
inequality and poverty by the World Bank in late 70’s. 1
The speciﬁcation above is later criticised by Anand and Kanbur (93b), who
1An earlier survey of these studies can be found in Fields (80).
6argue that the Kuznets hypothesis does not generally lead to a quadratic relation-
ship between inequality and growth. Anand and Kanbur (93a) puts Ahluwalia’s
estimates further to robustness tests allowing for diﬀerent functional forms and
ﬁnd that doing so results in shapes not resembling the original. The alternative
functional forms used in their research rely on empirical criteria rather than a
theoretical prior. Nevertheless, the choice of the functional form seems to matter
in the outcome even though there are no speciﬁc theories linking their estimations
to Ahluwalia’s. The choice functional form has been partly overcome later by
Deininger and Squire (1998) with the use of a new panel data set. By utilizing
their longitudinal data and using the inverse instead of the square-log per capita
icome in the above equation they ﬁnd little support for Kuznet’s hypothesis. In
their estimation per capita income fails to be siginiﬁcantly associated with changes
of inequality in the vast majority of countries. And Kuznets curve seems to explain
little of the variations in inequality across countries over time.
Barro (2000) extends his study of growth determninants by including inequality
in growth regressions and ﬁnds strong support for Kuznets curve.Unlike earlier
studies Barro(2000) ﬁnds that Kuznets curve appearent in the data also over time
and not only across countries at a point in time. However, like other studies
when the data set includes the variations in inequality across countries over time,
Kuznet’s curve does not explain much.
And ﬁnally, Piketty and Saez(2003) ﬁnd support for Kuznet’s hypothesis by
using individual tax return data between 1913 and 1998. If one considers tthe
information technology revolution arrived at the 70’s as a new wave of industrial-
ization They put steep progressive taxation as a plausible explanation as to why
the shocks of Great Depression and the World War II on the top capital owners
w e r ep e r m a n e n t .T h et o po ft h ew a g ed i s t r i b u t i o n ,t h e yﬁnd, have only recently
7passed their WWII level where the top capital icomes are even lower than their
WWI level.
A major problem with estimating the Kuznet’s original hypothesis is that the
recent increases and falls in inequality have to do more with technological shocks
rather than with migration linked changes in income distribution. A more coherent
approach is to think that industrialization processes come as waves and they are
started by a major technological breakthrough. For the latter part of the twentieth
century, such a revolution has taken place in information technology. Arrival of
computers indicate a start of an industrial revolution just like the steam engine
in the 18th century or later electricity in the 19th century. In this setup, one can
think of skill accumulation as the determining factor of the evolution of inequality.
And in fact, after the arrival of computers the inequality has risen in the major
industrialist countries which might be an indicator of that another inverted U
process has started oﬀ for the evolution of inequality. This has attracted a lot
of interest in the literature and will be mentioned later in the survey. Further
examples also exist in which the Kuznets hypothesis is applicaple. A counterpart
of the movement from rural to urban industry might be for instance a shift from
a ﬁnancially unsophisticated to a modern one.(Greenwood and Jovanovic 1990)
3 Main Approaches to Inequality and Growth Relation-
ship
There are many theories constructed to assess the relation between inequality and
economic growth and there are many ways to categorize these theories. To keep
things intact I will brieﬂy give an evaluation of the earlier theories which suggest a
positive relation between inequality and growth and classify the later approaches
under two headings; The nature of asset markets and the social contract which
8include politics of redistribution and social unrest.
One of the most important issues in the literature regards equity and eﬃciency
trade-oﬀ. Arthur Okun (1975):
The trade-oﬀ between equity and eﬃciency is our biggest socio-economic trade-
oﬀ. We can’t have our cake of market eﬃciency and share it equally.
The logic of the trade-oﬀ between equity and eﬃciency implies that policy
makers have the choice between higher inequality but higher living standars on
the average versus lower living standards but a more just income distribution. To
p u ti td i ﬀerently, more justice in distribution has a welfare cost in form of either
a lower output in a static context or a slower growth in a dynamic setting. Until
recently most of the economists agreed to the validity of this trade-oﬀ. The recent
empirical work has shown, however,that there is little evidence suggesting that
initial inequality in the distribution of income and wealth has a positive impact
on subsequent long-run growth rates. To the contrary, cross-country studies which
regress long-run growth rates on inequality mostly ﬁnd a negative correlation be-
tween them. And on a theoretical basis, increasing number of economists agree
that inequality itself may have negative incentive eﬀects. For instance, high in-
equality may lead to lower levels of work eﬀort,or it might reduce both incentives
and opportunities to undertake investments in productive education or innovative
activities.
Another suggestion for a positive sign is implied by Kaldor’s hypothesis which
states that marginal propensity to save of the rich is generally higher than that of
the poor. Since the traditional growth argument links the growth rates directly to
the savings rates, a more unequal distribution in an economy should generate more
growth, because more of the national income will be saved. The support for this
9view comes from Bourguignon (1981) who show that with a convex saving function
aggregate output is higher at the more unequal steady state. If the investments
are indivisible or require large sunk costs then concentration of wealth among
few individuals who will undertake those investments might be preferred. This
a r g u m e n th a sf o u n ds u p p o r ta m o n gt h ep o l i c y advisors to the developing countries
especially to the transition economies of former Soviet Union..
Finally another argument in support of the growth enhancing eﬀect of inequality
has been made in a moral hazard context. This occurs especially when the eﬀorts
by the agents are not observable, a just distribution of wages might reduce the
incentives to supply eﬀort.
All of these arguments are criticised by the recent literature which I will sum-
marize below
3.1 The Nature of Asset Markets
The nature of asset markets play an important role in the link between inequality
and growth. This is mainly so because of the fact that the classical arguments
presented above do not generally apply when the capital perfects are imperfect.
Stiglitz(1969) points out that when the capital markets are imperfect, the conver-
g e n c eo fw e a l t h sm i g h tn o tt a k ep l a c e .G a lor and Zeira(1993) examine the impact
of the redistribution of wealth on aggregate output through the investments in
human capital. When there are both imperfect capital markets and indivisibili-
ties in human capital investments, the initial distribution of wealth aﬀects both
aggregate output and the long run distribution of skills and wealth. The long
run distribution is mainly determined by the parental choices on education and
bequests and the subsequent investment opportunities of the oﬀspring.
When we assume diminishing marginal returns to investment in education or
10capital then there is a role for redistribution when the economy lacks a functioning
capital maket. The idea is that redistributing resources to those poorly endowed
with highest marginal returns to the investment will create opportunities which
enhances growth. Such an exercise is done by Aghion,Caroli and Penalosa (2003)
who show when there are no functioning capital markets that when the individual
production function is concave, greater inequality in the distribution wealth results
in a lower rate of growth. In their setup, redistribution creates investment oppor-
tunities in the absence of capital markets which in turn increases productivity and
growth.
Imperfect capital markets not only cause ineﬃciencies but also increase the
existing ones caused by inequality. For instance, lack of well developed credit and
l o a nm a yp r e v e n ti n d i v i d u a l sa tt h eb o t t o mo ft h ei n c o m eo rw e a l t hd i s t r t i b u t i o n
to undertake invetsments such as education which is the primary source for human
capital formation.
Another counter-argument to the traditional view can be stated in the following
way. Since the imperfect capital markets exist in the ﬁrst place due to moral haz-
ard, incomplete contracts(or repayment enforcement problems) or ex-post moral
hazard, then whenever there is moral hazard, inequality should be detrimental
growth. In support of this view, several authors have point out the inequality is
bad for growth as long as eﬀort is increasing in the wealth of individual. The
amount an individual borrows is negatively related to her incentives to supply ef-
fort because she has to share a larger fraction of the returns with the lender. In
this context, increasing the wealth of borrowers will enhance their incentives. On
t h eo t h e rh a n d ,t h es a m ea r g u m e n ta p p l i e st ol e n d e r si nan e g a t i v ei nt h a tt h el e s s
they have to lend the less they have to monitor. As long as the eﬀect on borrowers
incentives exceed the eﬀect on lenders incentives , decreasing inequality in a moral
11hazard situation should increase growth. Aghion and Bolton (1997) show under
such circumstances redistribution increases growth, but only when it is sustained
for a long time.
If capital markets and related institutions tend to improve as an economy grows,
then the eﬀects related to capital market imperfections are more important in
poor countries than in rich ones. Therefore the predicted eﬀects of inequality on
economic growth would be larger in magnitude for poor economies than for rich
ones. However, this is only one way in which the growth and inequality relationship
m i g h th a v eas i g n i ﬁcant sign in the poorer countries. Another possibility is that the
position of the poor and the demand for new products increase faster in developing
countries causing the ﬁrms to invest more and more in R&D instead of traditional
technologies. This is a rather new approach to the inequ a l i t ya n dg r o w t hp u z z l e
and is attempted later in the survey.
3.2 Social Contract and Politics of Redistribution
The balance of power in the political system determine political outcomes and
resulting redistributive policies. This strand of the literature deals with the so-
called political economy models of growth and redistribution. When individuals
vote for a preferred tax rate, inequality leads to higher taxation through the po-
litical process. For instance, a median voter in a more unequal society (inequality
can be measured by the ratio of mean to median income) would vote for a higher
tax rate or higher transfer payments and associated tax ﬁnance. Since welfare
payments and levies on labor income reduces work eﬀort and higher taxes distort
investment incentives which will reduce growth through incentive eﬀects an elec-
tion outcome causing more redistribution will reduce growth. In this respect it is
logical to expect the more equal societies to grow faster.
12The politics of redistribution and its relation to growth is analyzed by many
authors such as Saint Paul Verdier (1993) Alesina and Rodrik (1994) and Person
and Tabellini (1994)2. Person and Tabellini (1994) suggest that high inequality in
pre-tax incomes leads the majority of people to vote for redistribution which leads
to a progressive tax system. Person and Tabelini (1991) and Alesina and Rodrik
(1994) and Saint Paul Verdier (1993) ‘s political economy models show that change
in income distribution (e.g distortionary taxation) reduces the growth rate only
when the redistribution is from the poor to the rich. Banerjee and Duﬂo (2000)
argue in the short run any kind of redistribution reduces growth which implies any
change in inequality is followed by lower growth.
Easterly and Rebelo (1993) analyze the eﬀect of ﬁscal policy on growth for
both industrialized and developing countries. They ﬁnd that redistribution is
growth enhancing. Using spending on social instituitions and several tax rates
as indicators of the magnitude of redistribution. Other evidence from East Asian
economies show that redistribution in land or education is beneﬁcial for growth.
In the typical case wealth distribution changes slowly. Large changes in dis-
tribution over a relatively short period of time are largely due to intense social
conﬂict.The idea that sociopolitical conﬂict related to inequality reduces the secu-
rity of property rights and discourages accumulation.When the gap between the
rich and the poor widens the rent-seeking or predatory activities increase in both
number and intensity. The security of property rights is the main theme of the
models of The relation between social conﬂict and growth are analyzed by Gross-
man(1991) (1994), Acemoglu(1995), Tornell and Velasco(1992), Perotti (1996),
Grosman and Kim(1996) and Benabib and Rustichini (1998). In these models.
the economy’s potential growth rate is negatively related to the interest groups
2For an extensive survey of this literature see Benabou(1996)
13rent seeking abilities.
Another approach emphasizes the polarization in a society as a basis of social
conﬂict, which is in turn known to be detrimental to growth. Easterly (2000)
points out as the most common forms of social conﬂict, class polarization and
ethnic polarization. If a society lacks a middle class consensus, then groups in
that society will under-invest in education or other infrastructure as long as there
is mobility between them. A middle class consensus is a situation in which the a
high share of income for middle class is coupled with a minimal ethnic polariza-
tion in the society. Easterly(2000) tests the signiﬁcance of a middle class consensus
by assuming that the tropical commodity exporters are more unequal then other
societies. In this setup exogenous country characteristics such as resource endow-
ments are a proxy for the existence of a middle class consensus. Easterly(2000)
ﬁnds in the data that lower ethnic polarization and higher share of middle class
income are associated with“higher income, higher growth, more education, bet-
ter health, better infrastructure, better economic policies, less political instability,
less civil war (putting ethnic minorities at risk), more social modernization, and
more democracy”. Since Easterly(2000) is able conﬁrm the hypothesis with cross-
country data, a possible use of resource endowments as instruments for inequality
emerges.
3.3 Inequality in Purchasing Power, The Role of Demand Patterns and
Nonlinearity
It is suprising that there has been only recent attention in growth literature on
how inequality-determined demand structures aﬀect the incentives to innovate
and hence growth. What I mean by an inequality-determined demand structure
is the distribution of demand across goods at a given time as a result of wealth
14distribution. A distribution of demand can easily be found if one assumes people
have hierarchic preferences ,which translates to ranking of goods in an order where
the highest goods are the most luxurious and the lowest are the most basic ones.
Once this is done the demand for any good can be linked to the inequality level.
Hierarchic preferences of this sort have their place in literature. Engel’s law,for
instance states that as incomes grow people spend proportionally less on food.
The results of Zweimuller (2001) conﬁrm the negative relation between inequal-
ity and growth. How the inequality aﬀects the demand spectrum for innovators
in a dynamic context is the main contribution of his article. In other words, the
inequality plays a role in determining both today‘s and tomorrows demand for
new and better products hence also the innovators incentive to innovate.
T oi l l u s t r a t et h er e l e v a n c eo ft h i sa p p r o a c h ,l e tm er e c o n s i d e rb r i e ﬂy the recent
empirical literature on inequality and growth. Just previous to the panel data
presented by Deininger and Squire (1996) researchers have found a robust nega-
tive relationship between initial income inequality and growth3. Later researchers
have presented contrasting ﬁxed eﬀect estimates using the data set4. Barro(1999)
ﬁnds no overall relation between income inequality and rates of growth, unless
the sample is divided as rich and poor countries. To complicate matters further,
Banerjee and Duﬂo(2000) ﬁnd that any change in inequality is associated with
lower future growth rates. They also list a number of empirical reasons for the
wide array of ﬁndings, including the diﬀerent data sets used with regards to ﬁxed
eﬀects estimation, diﬀerent time-lags assumed or the diﬀerent control variables
included.
In a Schumpeterian setup, Engel’s law gives us a theoretical clue as to what
the sources of discrepancies between the above empirical ﬁndings might be. As
3See Alesina and Rodrik(94), Persson and Tabellini (94), Perotti(96)
4See Li and Zou(98), Benhabib and Spiegel (98), Forbes(00)
15incomes rise so does the proportion spent on new more eﬃciently produced goods.
At the top of hiearchy there are luxuries which are historically evolved to being
ineﬃciently produced goods probably due to a chronic low demand. With an un-
equal distribution of income a redistribution from rich to poor increases growth as
it increases the demand for new goods by the poor without changing the demand
by the rich. But if the poor is rich enough to consume most of the new goods a
further redistribution might lead ineﬃciencies in production, reducing growth.
In the second chapter I will present a model which accounts for the nonlinear
relationship between inequality and growth as evidenced by recent empirical litera-
ture. The demand for new products and wealth distribution is closely linked when
people have hierarchic preferences. At high and low levels of inequality, an in-
crease in inequality has opposite eﬀects on growth. The mechanics of the model is
such that the entering ﬁrm’s potential market size determines the level of growth,
whereas the market size is determined by the inequality level, the ﬁnite patent
length and the growth rate. Initially, as the poor’s incomes increase the growth
increases because the demand for new, R&D intensive goods increase. However,
as the inequality declines below a certain minimum, the demand for luxuries go
up high enough so that the resources are diverted to ineﬃcient production meth-
ods reducing growth. Hence, there is a non-linear relation between inequality and
growth
Furthermore it is shown that in this setup any increase in patent length increases
growth. The magnitude of this eﬀect diﬀers with existing inequality level and time
preference. The optimal patent length turns out to be inﬁnite because monopolist
ﬁrms do not mark-up during their monopolist life. This is assumed for tractability
purposes. Even though the inequality is higher in some richer countries than the
poorer ones, the purchasing power of the poor in the rich country is high enough
16to support new innovations. This might explain the empirical discrepancies found
in the literature.
3.4 Recent Empirical Findings on the Eﬀect of Inequality on Growth
The puzzle about the inequality and growth partly stemmes from the fact that
the data sets produced have neither been suﬃcient nor reliable until last decade.
This problem is also magniﬁed with the use of proxies for wealth inequality for
which extensive data does not exist and the bulk of the theory emphasizes the
role of wealth distribution as it is what really matters to the growth process. The
most common approach to empirical analysis has been to regress long term growth
rates(about 20-25 years) on initial inequality. The choice of long-term growth rates
is not arbitrary. Easterly et al.(1993)@@ ﬁnd the growth rates have low intertem-
poral persistence within countries.Within this approach, Benabou(1996) compares
South Korea and Phillipines in terms of their macroeconomic performance and
their initial inequaliy levels. Benabou (1996) ﬁnds that Phillipine, initially with
a higher level inequality, has experienced a much lower growth rate than South
Korea over a 30 year period.
Deininger and Squire(1998) have at least partly overcome the problem of ﬁnd-
ing “quality” data set5,which they based on household surveys with the coverage
of all sources of income rather than only wages. Empirical studies using this
data set have sparked more discussions with regards to the eﬀect of inequality on
growth.(more here) Deininger and Squire(1998) ﬁnd that the eﬀect of initial in-
come distribution and subsequent growth is not very robust. However, inequality
in the initial distribution of land rather than income turns out to be negatively
related to subsequent growth. This would lend support to the imperfect capital
5see Deininger and Squire(1998) for a criteria of a ‘quality‘ data set. They exclude some countries not ﬁtting
those. For a critique of their criteria and the exclusion of those countries see Atkinson and Brandolini (99)
17markets argument above, in which the land might act as a form of collateral when-
ever there are investment indivisibilities. Another important ﬁnding is that the
investment is signiﬁcant for growth and declining in income levels, which supports
the idea that creating new assets have greater impact on poverty reduction than
redistribution of assets.
Benabou (1999) ﬁnds that most of the studies of the last decade indicate a neg-
ative relationship between inequality and growth .The opposite ﬁnding is reported
by Forbes (2000) who argues that the previous estimates are biased due to a po-
tential correlation between the explanatory variables 6. Forbes result is recently
challenged by Banerjee and Duﬂo (2000) who argue that by imposing a linear
relation on a highly non-linear data7 Forbes misinterpreted the data. Their argu-
ment relies on the fact that in the data both increases and decreases in inequality
are followed by a reduction in growth rate. Therefore, they suggest a non-linear
relationship between changes in inequality and changes in growth. They support
their nonlinear speciﬁcation with a simple political economy model based on rent
grabbing.
Banerjee and Duﬂo (2000) also suggest that there is mismeasurement in the
Deininger and Squire Data (1996). They list the countries where the gini coeﬃ-
cient changed drastically in the adjacent two periods. They argue these drastic
changes are not necessarily due to a political conﬂict but due to measurement
error. They argue that the statistical agency is more likey to mismeasure when
there is an economic or political crisis during which also the growth rate falls.
Hence, one will expect an u-shaped relation between measured changes in inequal-
6Previous studies report the OLS estimates of:
(yit+a−yit)
a = αyit + Xitβ + δgit + vi +  it wher yit is the logarithm of GDP in country i at date t , a is the
time length for measuring growth rate, Xit is a set of control variables, git is the Gini coeﬃcient in country i at
date t and vi is a country ﬁxed eﬀect.
Forbes(2000) argues git and vi i nt h ea b o v ee q u a t i o na r ec o r r e l a t e d
7Forbes(2000) used the panel data provided by Deiniger and Squire (1996)
18ity and changes in the growth rate, rather than in absolute values. They ﬁnd that
a n yc h a n g ei ni n e q u a l i t yi sf o l l o w e db yar e d u c t i o ni ng r o w t hr a t e . T h e ya r g u e
that their speciﬁcation is suﬃcient to explain the discrepancies of the previous
estimates, although their underlying model is rather unsatisfactory in political
economy literature standards and rather conjectured to create nonlinearity.
4 Sources of Wage Inequality
In this section, I will try to outline the ideas on the sources of wage inequality
as it matters to the growth process. There is a huge literature on the sources of
inequality , both historical and modern. Here I will conﬁne my survey to the rising
wage inequality during the last couple of decades in US and UK, although the ideas
apply in a much more general context including developing countries. There are
three broad categories under which the sources rising inequality can be identiﬁed.
Technological change , globalization or trade liberalization and deunionization.
4.1 Technological Change
A regular observation of the last two decades has been the rising wage inequality
in industrialized countries (Gottschalk (1997)) . The striking aspect of this ob-
servation is that the wage inequality has been increasing not only across groups
with diﬀerent professions ,schooling and skills but also within the same group, no
matter how it is narrowly deﬁed. This fact lead to a number of theories where
skill biased technological change is the driving force in determining innequality.
The technological change is ‘skill biased’ in the sense that it reinforces existing
diﬀerences in abilities among workers within or across educational or other co-
horts. Although technological change can put an upward pressure on the demand
for skilled workers, the supply of skilled workers also increases through education
19as a response. This would normally bring a fall in the wage gap. The puzzle here
is that despite the evidence of increasing supply of skilled workers causing the skill
premia to fall in the 70’s and despite the further evidence on increasing skill premia
in the 80’s , the within-group wage inequality has been steadily increasing since
the 70’s. Another part of the puzzle lies in the fact that even though there has
been extensive technological progress after 70’s there also has been a productivity
slowdown.
Why does then technological progress lie behind the increasing wage inequal-
ity? In the last 25 years there has been a substantial increase in wage dispersion
within educational groups in the U.S. This is also a time period when the pace of
investment-embodied technological change has accelerated. The initial explana-
tions were that the rising wage inequality was due to higher returns to education
which produced the skills necessary to match the new technological requirements
of the production processes. Such a link between the two observations above has
been explored by several authors8who commonly have pointed out that workers
with high skills learn the new technologies and move to the top of wage spectrum
faster whenever there is faster embodied technical change. The rising skill pre-
mia,however, can not fully explain the rise in wage ineuality. If higher returns
to education were the sole reason of rising wage inequality we would not observe
the increased dispersion of incomes within the educational cohorts as documented
by Gottschalk and Murphy (1994). The workers , for the most part , earn their
skills on the job through either learning-by-doing or spillovers from other workers
or production units. Moreover, in a period of high technical change uncertainty
eﬀects those who are at the bottom of the wage spectrum more. Poor people are
more prone to shocks. And ﬁnally, the skill-speciﬁc jobs are easily lost when the
8Violante (1997), Jovanovic,(1998), Greenwood and Yorukoglu (1997)
20state of technology shifts substantially. This is true especially with the low-level
skill speciﬁcj o b s .
One of the theories that link inequality to technological progress is as follows:
The adoption of new technologies involves a signiﬁcant cost in terms of learning
in which the skilled labor has an advantage. This is attributable to the fact that
educated workers can both assimilate and apply the new ideas better and faster.
Therefore, a shift in the state of technology will be associated with an increase in
the demand for skilled labor. The skill premium will rise and income inequality
will widen. The implied evolution of the age distribution of equipment by a higher
rate of embodied technological change lead to changes in the equilibrium wage
distribution. This is due to either accumulation of skills on the job ,transferability
of skills across jobs or the mobility decision of workers.. Violante(1997) points out
that technological progress aﬀect wage inequality through the way skill dynamics of
the agents interact with the technological environment. Jovanovic (1997) indicates
that the equilibrium wage distribution for the ex-ante equal workers widens because
high-skilled workers become more selective relative to unskilled ones and turn down
jobs on old and less productive technologies. This creates a positive sorting in the
equilibrium assignment of workers to technologies) which increases the dispersion
of wages. Another argument by Jovanovic et. al. (1997) states that the inequality
is a result of the complementarity between machine quality and skills. A worker
who is matched with the best machine will acquire more skill and inequality will
persist indeﬁnitely. Moreover, since new machines will be used by the most skilled
workers, the inequality will increase with the pace of technological change.
Some authors have pointed out that the skill biased nature of the technolog-
ical change is merely an exogeneous process. It is rather an exploitation on the
ﬁrm’s side of the availables skills by investing more in to R&D and to make use
21of the falling skilled wages. Such a paper, Acemoglu(1998), relates the increasing
inequality to increasing number of skilled workers who induce skill biased techno-
logical change This type of technological change increases the skill premium in the
long-run and inequality follows. The rapid increase in the proportion of college
graduates in the United States labor force is shown to be the reason of the increase
in inequality during the 1980s. The main argument there is that the induced tech-
nological changes are skill-complementary not by nature but by design. Therefore,
the resulting inequality is a result of preferred type of technological change by the
investment sector.
Let me also mention a couple of observations on the nature and timing of the
technological progress the industrialist countries have experienced; Gordon(1990)
shows that there have been widespread technological improvements in durable
goods equipments by analyzing the data on quality-adjusted price indexes over the
last 50 years. In addition, Greenwood and Yorukoglu(1974) show that the speed
of this progress has accelerated about 30 % since the mid 70’s. Further evidence
of the 70’s rapid technology improvements come from Krusell, Ohanian,Rios-Rull
and Violante (1998). It is the nature of the rechnological progresses which increase
the inequality.
To illustrate ideas more clearly I will borrow from Aghion,Howitt, and Vi-
olante(2002) Suppose every new technology has its own speciﬁcations and there-
fore requires some time to be learned. The productivity of the worker using the
new machine increases as she learns by doing. Let the factor, with which the
productivity of the worker increases, be η. Her productivity next year will be mul-
tiplied by a total factor of (1 + η), if she starts with a new machine today and
stays with it next year. Suppose now that the technologies gradually arrive and all
experience the worker accumulates is not transferrable to the new technology. Let
22the the fraction of abilities she can transfer to the new technology τ ∈ [0,1]. If the
worker then moves from the new machine she used last year to the newly arrived
machine, her productivity is multiplied by an amount of (1 + τη) next period.
There is also a possibility that the worker was working in an old machine in the
ﬁrst year and she decides to move to the leading edge old technology instead of the
new technology. By moving to the leading edge old technology next year she will
beneﬁt from spillovers from the workers, who’ve stayed with the “new” machine
t h e y ’ v es t a r t e du s i n gt h i sy e a r .T h ep r o d u c t i v i t yi n c r e a s eo ft h eo l dp l a n t si sd u e
to the experience gained in organization, production processes and operation of
markets. Let denote the increase in productivity caused by this spillover eﬀect
(1 + ξη).ξ∈ [0,1].
Let nij be the productivity units of labor joining technology j from technology
with age i. The productivity units of labor for each machine can be expressed as :
x0 =( 1 + τη)n00+n10
x1 =( 1 + η)n01+(1 + ξη)n11
where x0 is the newer machine. If τ =0 , then the new technologies require com-
pletely diﬀerent skills. On the other hand if τ =1 , then all skills are completely
transferrable to the new technology. As τ goes from 0 to 1, the use technology
becomes more independent of speciﬁc skills or all new technologies use more the
same type skills as the incumbent one. In other words, as τ approaches 1 the tech-
nology resembles a general purpose technology. Similarly, If ξ =1then knowledge
is fully spilled over to the newcomers as opposed to the case ξ =0 , in which no
knowledge is shared within the ﬁrm. Let’s assume perfect labor markets with an
adaptability constraint to prevent all workers being assigned to the new machines.
23To introduce such an adaptability constraint, let σ denote the probability that
every worker can be productive on the leading edge technology. With the law of
large numbers then at most only a fraction σ of the total workers are employed




Furthermore, let γ be the growth rate of the prodctivity in successive tech-
nological improvements and let Yt =( AtKt)αx1−α
t , where At =( 1+γ)t, be the
production function the ﬁrm faces. In equilibrium, with the assumption of perfect
labor markets, the marginal product of labor will be equal to the wage rate.










Given the above wage schedule each worker faces then two options; move to
the new machine or stay. To analyze how inequality changes with respect to
transferability (τ), spillover (ξ), learning-by-doing (η),adaptability (σ), and the
speed of embodied technological change (γ), one has to solve for x0 and x1 in
equilibrium. The summary of the results are given in the following table

























stands for ‘not applicable’.The comparative statics results are summarized in the
following table.










τ=0,ξ=1 NA >0 <0 <0N A
τ=0,0<ξ<19 NA >0 ≷0 <0 <0
0<τ<1,ξ=1 >0 >0 ≷0 <0N A
Table 2. Comparative Statics
• Case 1 : No Skill Transferability(τ=0),PerfectSpillover(ξ=1)
When skills can not be transferred to the leading edge and there is perfect
spillover, there are two seperate wages in equilibrium earned by workers in
the old and the new sector. First, wage inequality increases with the γ.
Those who can adapt to new technologies will earn relatively more if the
technological progress accelerates. Second, the more workers can adapt to
the new technologies the less discrepancy there will be in wages due to the
supply eﬀect. And third, if the rate of learning-by-doing increases then the
comparative advantage of moving to the new sector versus remaining in the
old technology diminishes reducing wage inequality.
• Case 2: No Skill Transferrability(τ=0),Partial Spillover(0<ξ<1)
When there is no transferability and only partial spillover, in other words,
when the novice workers can neither fully exploit the experienced workers
knowledge nor they can bring any skills from their previous assignment, there
will be two distinct wages respectively for experienced and novice workers
in equilibrium. Given a skill scale , a higher spillover beneﬁts those workers
more who are at the bottom, thus a decrease in the spillover rate increases in-
equality. Moreover , as the magnitude of spillover decreases, the productivity
9For γ>ξ η
25increase gained by moving to the leading edge is higher if the technological
progress accelerates. Thus, the eﬀect of technological progress on inequality
is not only positive but also higher than Case 1. With respect to the eﬀect of
the adapatability rate, As in the ﬁrst case a higher rate of adapatability means
that in equilibrium more workers adapt which reduces the wages associated
with newer machines.
• Case 3: Partial Skill Transferrability(0<τ<1),Perfect Spillover(ξ=1)
Allowing for transferability implies that there are three distinct wages in equi-
librium; of those moving from previous leading edge to today’s leading edge , of
those moving from the old sector the new leading-edge and of those staying with
their previous machines. In this case, increased transferability gives an edge to
those workers, who can adapt to the new technology, over those who can not, thus
increasing wage gap. At the same time, more transferability leads to more workers
adapting to the new technology in equilibrium which reduces the wage gap.It can
be shown that the ﬁrst eﬀect (1 + τη) dominates the second one(1 + στη). When
the skills are transferable, a higher rate of learning-by-doing(η) implies that once
a worker moves to the leading edge technology he can beneﬁt of his skills with new
technology , but at the same time remaining workers do increase their productiv-
ity faster, as in case I, thus the net eﬀect of a higher rate of learning-by-doing on
wage inequality is ambigious. Finally, a higher rate of adapatibility increases the
total productivity of the new machine workers but at the same time reduces their
wages due to the increased supply of skills available for the leading edge machines.
Moreover, the second eﬀect becomes ever more dominant as the transferability
increases. Therefore, higher adapatibility implie lower wage inequality.
The parameter, τ, in the above model can also be interpreted as the generality of
26technology. So a higher τ implies that the technology at hand is a general purpose
technology, the use of which permeates through all sectors after its invention.
One of the main problems in this strand of literature is that there has not
been an increase in the rate of productivity growth in the data since 1980’s. This
has started another wave of discussions related to calculations of total factor pro-
ductivity as a measure of technical change. Total factor productivity calculations
have several problems. For instance, it is explained also by other variables like
age of capital, capital labor ratio and the rate of ouput growth. Moreover, it does
not accurately reﬂect skill biased technical change since its increase apply to both
unskilled and skilled workers equally. Some of the more appropriate measures are
the use of R&D expenditures or the computer usage. There is strong support for
skill biased technical change in the empirical literature by using these measures.
Berman, Bound and Griliches (74) show that R&D expenditures and computers
have signiﬁcantly positive impact on the increase in share of non-production work-
ers in the total wage bill.10 Once having solved the ‘appropriateness of the measure’
problem, the question, however, still remains: Why is the technical change is not
reﬂected in the aggregate data? A possible solution is to look at the eﬀects of a
widespread technological shock,like the information technology revolution in the
1970’s.
4.2 General Purpose Technologies
One plausible way of explaining the rising inequality across industries is by analyz-
ing disembodied technological change, by which technological improvements arrive
as shocks and eﬀect all industries. Such a technological shock might be deﬁned as
a general purpose technology which is a technological invention and spreads to the
10For a survey of empirical evidence on this issue see Aghion, Caroli, Penalosa(1999)
27entire production line both across and within industries. One of the proposed ex-
planations for the rising wage inequality is that the nature of a new GPT diﬀusion
is non-linear. This is because existence of strategic complementarities between the
various sectors of the economy may generate temporary lock-in eﬀects. The idea
is a ﬁrm might choose not to implement the new GPT unless other ﬁrms do so.
Or in other words, implementation of a GPT might become beneﬁcial only if the
ﬁrm can make gains through social learning (by means of network externalities)
from other ﬁrms.How does this relate to wage inequality? The arrival of a new
GPT diminishes the stock of human capital, just like the vintages in the above
model, which lead to increased mobility. This leads to sorting of skilled workers in
technologically advanced sectors and ineuality increases. Once the GPT is adopted
by more and more industries, mobility diminishes and so does inequality. With
regards to the question above the implementation of a new technology may induce
a temporary productivity slowdown during the experimentation period. Moreover,
the productivity increases caused by secondary product innovations related to the
use of GPT might not immediately show up in the statistics.
4.3 Trade Liberalization and Deunionization
Another possible explanation to the rising wage inequality has been trade liberal-
ization. Increased trade between developing and developed countries will increase
inequality in developed countries, since the demand for skilled labor in the de-
veloped country will increase as a result of specialization in the skill intensive
good there. While in the developing country the demand for skilled labor will
dcerase and inequality will go down. This analysis is just a simple extension if
the Hecksher-Ohlin model which states that countries specialize in the produc-
t i o no ft h o s eg o o d sw h i c hu s ei n t e n s i v e l yt h ef a c t o r so fp r o d u c t i o ni nw h i c ht h e y
28are abundantly endowed with. Although the trade argument seems very strong
it has not been supported by data. The empirical ﬁndings on the trade’s role in
increasing inequality are reviewed later in the survey.
Unions have the traditional role of wage supression. One of the main charac-
teristics of the labor markets in the 1980’s have been deunionizations which might
have contributed to rising inequality. Theoretically, a higher union coverage for
workers imply a higher bargaining power and higher wages. Several authors have
found strong support for deunionization in explaining rising inequality which will
be covered in the next chapter.
4.4 Recent Empirical Findings on the Sources of Rising Wage Inequal-
ity
4.4.1 Technological Progress
The empirical ﬁndings on the sources of rising wage inequality and its link with the
technological progress come from diﬀerent sources.First, there is evidence solely on
the technological improvements via the quality adjusted price indices for durable
production equipments. There are also ﬁndings solely on the rising wage inequality
between or within cohorts of education, skills etc. And ﬁnally there are ﬁndings
on the link between them.
The puzzle with regards to the empirical ﬁndings on technological progress is
about the slow productivity growth during 1972-1995. During this period US fell
behind in numerous industries outside the IT sector in terms of prodictivity despite
a l lt h et e c h n o l o g i c a li m p r o v e m e n t s ( G o r d on(2002)). As explained above the arrival
and the slow diﬀusion of GPT causing the productivity initially to fall has been
already put forward as an explanation by several authors.
The technological progress is measured by using either quality-adjusted rel-
29ative price of capital or by estimating vintage eﬀects in a speciﬁed production
function. First, the major ﬁnding about the technological progress is made by
Gordon (90) who documents the technological progress over the last half of the
twentieth century using the declining quality adjusted price indices for durable
production equipments. The decline in quality adjusted price indexes generally
attributed the arrival of computers as a form of GPT. In addition, Greenwood and
Yorukoglu (97) show that the rate of embodied technological change has increased
about 33% on the average in the decade following the year 1974. Gordon (2002)
documents a further technological acceleration, particularly in information tech-
nology, between 1995 and 2000 which lead to the revival of productivity growth.
The post-1995 technological acceleration, particularly in information technology
(IT) and accompanying revival of productivity growth, directly contributed both
to faster output growth. Gordon (02) further ponits out that the technological ac-
celeration was made possible in part by permanent sources of American advantage
over Europe and Japan. Some of them are the mixed system of government- and
privately-funded research universities, the large role of U. S. government agencies
providing research funding based on peer review and the strong tradition of patent
and securities regulation. Others are the leading worldwide position of U.S. busi-
ness schools and U. S.-owned investment banking, accounting, and management-
consulting ﬁrms, and the particular importance of the capital market for high-tech
ﬁnancing led by a uniquely dynamic venture capital industry. The above time path
of productivity slow-downs and accelerations have been used as a sort of conjecture
to link the wage inequality and technological progress.
Second there are observations on the rising wage inequality during the last
quarter of the century. Recently, Gottschalk and Moﬃtt (2002) decompose the
rise in cross-sectional variance of male annual earnings in the U.S. from 1969 to
301996 into permanent and transitory components. They ﬁnd that the variance of
permanent earnings began rising in the late 1970s and has continued to rise in
the 1980s. The variance of transitory earnings also rose in the 1980s but declined
in the 1990s. Part of this observation is also conﬁrmed by Pikett and Saez(2003)
who ﬁnd that the wage inequality has stabilized in the second half of the 90’s.
Ap r e v i o u sﬁnding by Gottschalk (1994) ﬁnd that the wage inequality has not
only substantially increased across educational, professional or other cohorts but
also within those groups which is the departing point of the second part of this
survey. Further support comes from Mincer(91) who ﬁnds that college graduates
earnings, with an average of 8 years experience , have increased relative to those of
high school graduates in a period where the R&D intensity has also substantially
increased.11
Finally , the evidence on the link between the technological progress and the
wage inequality Starting from the 1970’s there is a positive relation in the time se-
ries between inequality within cohorts and the investment speciﬁc technical change.
For instance, Allen(1996) looks at wage diﬀerentials by industry and ﬁnds that
they are related to R&D intensity, usage of high-tech capital, age of technology,
growth in total factor productivity, and growth of the capital-labor ratio. More
speciﬁcally how changes in technology are related to changes in wage diﬀerentials
by schooling, experience, and gender. Allen(1996) ﬁnds that returns to schooling
are larger in industries that have intense innovative activity and high-tech capital.
In fact, technology variables account for 30 percent of the increase in the wage gap
between college and high school graduates. Krueger(1993) also ﬁnds that workers
using computers are better compensated than those who do not.
Despite the abundance of evidence supporting the technological progress as a
11See Levy and Murnane(1992) and Juhn, Murphy and Pierce(1993) for further evidence on wage inequality
during 70’s and 80’s
31possible source of inequality the issue is still in debate. Some authors have dis-
cussed the validity of the technological progress as an explanation of the rising in-
equality, especially after the emergence of data for the period in 1995-2000. Among
those, Card and DiNardo(2002) review the evidence in favor of this hypothesis,
focusing on the implications of skill biased technological change for economy-wide
trends in wage inequality, and for the evolution of wage diﬀerentials between var-
ious groups. A fundamental problem for the skill bieased technological change
hypothesis, they argue, is that wage inequality stabilized in the 1990s, despite
continuing advances in computer technology, which is, in fact, supported by th
ﬁndings of Gordon(02). Skill biased technological change does neither oﬀer an
explanation to the closing of the gender gap nor to the stability of the racial wage
gap. Furthermore, the dramatic rise in education-related wage gaps for younger
versus older workers is not fully explained by skill biased technological change also.
Another objection comes from Piketty and Saez(2003) using individual tax return
data between 1913 and 1998 ﬁnd that the technological progress cannot account
fully for the observed facts.Their arguments in explaining the are close to those of
Kuznets(54) in the sense that they put social norms forward as an explanation of
the observed wage pattern.
4.4.2 Trade
Trade between developed or high skill countries and developing or low skill coun-
tries shaould cause an increase in the demand in the developed country for skill
intensive goods in which it has a comparative advantage. If the trade occurs in the
ﬁnal goods sector than the demand increase should favor those industries which
use high skilled workers and cause the skill premia to increase. The inequality
32shuold consequently increase across industries (between high skill and low skill
industries) rather than within industries. Therefore, even before examining the
relevant empirical research on the trade in ﬁnal goods and its eﬀect on inequality
one would expect that it won’t ﬁtw e l lt od a t aw h i c hs h o w si n c r e a s i n gi n e q u a l i t y
both across and within cohorts.
If the trade occurs, however, in intermediate goods sector , then there is a
possibility of widening of inequality among the workers. If , for instance, unskilled
labor is a substitute for intermediate inputs then a declining price of inputs due to
trade liberalization will cause the demand for unskilled labor to fall and the demand
for its complementarities such as skilled labor to increase. In this setup the prices
of ﬁnal goods would remain the same.Therefore, allowing trade in intermediate
goods might cause a widening inequality within industries conﬁrming data.
As expected, there is little support for the implications of the increasing trade
in ﬁnal goods. Berman, Bound and Griliches(1994) ﬁnd only 30% of the demand
increase for skilled workers can be explained by inter-industry labor movements
between 1979-1987. Moreover, Machin (1996) ﬁnds a similar result for UK data,
in which more than 80% of the increase in the demand for non-manual share is
due to within industry shifts. Another important,but disputed link is that for the
skilled labor wages relatively to increase the relative prices of the skill intensive
goods should fall, for which there is little evidence(Slaughter (1998))
With regards to trade intermediate goods , however, the results are more sup-
portive of the theory implications First, Falk and Koebel (1997) ﬁnd evidence
in the German data that unskilled labor is more substitutable to material in-
puts than skilled labor in the manufacturing and construction sectors. They es-
timate the cross-price elasticities between production factors such as unskilled
labor (no degree), skilled labor (high school degree),high-skilled labor(university
33degree),capital and materials. A negative cross price elasticity implies that the
factors are substitutes whereas a positive cross price elasticity implies that the
factors are complements. They ﬁnd a high degree of substitutability between ma-
terial inputs and unskilled labor in the manufacturing and construction sectors.
They also ﬁnd that the demand for high skilled labor is increased by a lower price
of material inputs in some sectors. In fact, tha data show that the price of material
inputs did fall in Germany at an average 2.4% per year from the last half of 1970’s
into the ﬁrst half of 1990’s. In US the decline was at 1.3% per year.
A more recent evidence on the role of trade is put forward by Feenstra and
Hanson (1999) who develop an empirical framework to assess the importance of
trade and technical change on the wages of production and nonproduction work-
ers. Trade is measured by the foreign outsourcing of intermediate inputs, while
technical change is measured by the shift towards high-technology capital such
as computers. They ﬁnd that both foreign outsourcing and expenditures on high-
technology equipment can explain a substantial amount of the increase in the wages
of nonproduction (high-skilled) relative to production (low-skilled) workers that oc-
curred during the 1980s. Surprisingly, it is expenditures on high-technology capital
other than computers that are most important. These results are very sensitive,
however, to their assumption that industry prices are independent of productivity.
When, for instance, they allow for the endogeneity of industry prices, then ex-
penditures on computers becomes the most important cause of the increased wage
inequality, and have a 50% greater impact than does foreign outsourcing.
4.4.3 Deunionization and Organizational Change
Amanda Gosling, Thomas Lemieux (2001) compare trends in male and female
hourly wage inequality in the United Kingdom and the United States between
341979 and 1998. They ﬁnd that the pattern of wage inequality became increasingly
similar in the two countries during this period. They attribute this convergence to
’U.S. style’ reforms that have taken place during that period in the U.K. labour
market. The inequality in UK,just like deunionization, has increased faster than
the US during the same period. For women, we conclude that the fall and sub-
sequent recovery in the real value of the U.S. minimum wage explains why wage
inequality increased faster in the United States than in the United Kingdom dur-
ing the 1980s, while the opposite happened during the 1990s. Interestingly, the
introduction of the National Minimum Wage in the U.K. in 1999 also contributed
to the convergence in labour market institutions and wage inequality between the
two countries.
Card, Lemieux, Riddell (2003) present a comparative analysis of the link be-
tween unionization and wage inequality in the U.S., the U.K., and Canada. Their
main motivation is to see whether unionization can account for diﬀerences and
trends in wage inequality in industrialized countries. They focus on the U.S., the
U.K., and Canada because the institutional arrangements governing unionization
and collective bargaining are relatively similar in these three countries. The three
countries also share large non-union sectors that can be used as a comparison group
for the union sector. Using comparable micro data for the last two decades, we ﬁnd
that unions have remarkably similar qualitative impacts in all three countries. In
particular, unions tend to systematically reduce wage inequality among men, but
have little impact on wage inequality for women. They conclude that unionization
helps explain a sizable share of cross-country diﬀerences in male wage inequality
among the three countries. They also conclude that de-unionization explains a
substantial part of the growth in male wage inequality in the U.K. and the U.S.
since the early 1980s.
354.4.4 US vs Europe
Contrary to US there was almost no change in wage inequality in continental Eu-
ropean economies. (Nickel and Bell,1996). The skill premia have mostly remained
constant. Among the answers given by the economists the following are the most
common:
i) the relative supply of skills have increased faster than US
ii) wage bargaining instituitions have prevented inequality from increasing
The ﬁrst explanation claims that the more rapid increase in the realitive sup-
ply of skills prevented the skill premia from increasing. The second explanation
emphasizes the role of wage setting instituitions, which indirectly control the em-
ployment of the skilled. Firms respond to wage bargaining by reducing their
demand for the unskilled and by increasing the relative employment of the skilled
workers. As a result , the low skill workers wages are higher in equilibrium and
their employment is lower. Using the Luxembourg Income Studies Data and a rel-
ative supply-demand framework Acemoglu (2002) ﬁnds evidence supporting both
answers.
4.5 Growth, Inequality and Employment
Another major issue to consider is how the beneﬁts brought about by growth are
shared by diﬀerent classes of the society. The emergence of the political
5C o n c l u s i o n
In this survey I reviewed the evolution of the Kuznets process and the recent
theoretical and empirical ﬁndings in the literature. It turns out that although
36the negative relation between inequality and growth is now well established in
the literature, there are still discrepancies in the recent empirical ﬁndings. As a
possible solution I propose to emphasize the eﬀect of demand patterns,caused by
inequality, on innovative activities, hence growth.
M o s to ft h et i m ee c o n o m i cg r o w t hi sa c c o m p a n i e dw i t haw i d e n i n gi n c o m e
distribution One good example is the post-war U.S. economy which has steadily
experienced an increase in per-capita income and income inequality at the same
time in the last 25 years. The feature of this phenomenon is that the inequality re-
mains increased no matter how narrowly one deﬁnes observable control groups such
as experience, education,gender,race,industry,occupation,etc. Interestingly,the in-
vestment speciﬁc technological change has also rapidly increased during the same
period. These two characteristics of the observed data suggests that the expla-
nations based on the nature of new frontier technology adoption and learning by
doing are more plausible. Other explanations of the rising wage inequality include
trade liberalization and deunionization.
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